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CLIENT CONFIDENCES AND CLIENT PERJURY:
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
MONROE H. FREEDMANt
Due process requires, at a minimum, that each litigant have an
opportunity to be heard.1 Implicit in this fundamental rule of fairness
is that being heard matters.
In appellate litigation, being heard ordinarily means that each ad-
vocate will have the opportunity to present arguments to the court, in
writing and orally. One of the most valuable aspects of the oral presen-
tation is that judges typically ask questions of counsel. These questions
give the advocate insight into what aspects of the case concern one or
more members of the court, and they provide the opportunity to re-
spond directly to those concerns. Since the court in any case might be
closely divided, the crucial swing vote could well hinge upon the answer
to a single question.
Of course, a question may be hostile and intended to embarrass
counsel or even to provoke an argument with another member of the
court.2 Even then, however, counsel's answer to the question might
help to persuade an undecided member of the court and alter the
balance.
After a case has been decided on a close vote, it can be useful to
consider how different answers to the judges' questions might affect a
later case. Also, if judges display an interest in particular issues during
oral argument, but then leave those issues unresolved in their opinions,
there is reason to infer that the issues have been left to decide in a later
case, perhaps with different alignments among the judges.
Nix v. Whiteside' is such a case. The purpose of this Article is to
examine three major but unanswered issues in Whiteside. During the
Whiteside argument, the Justices raised two of these issues: (1) what
- Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. A.B. 1951, Harvard Col-
lege; LL.B. 1954, Harvard University; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University.
' See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
("'The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard.'" (quoting
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))).
2 During Justice Frankfurter's last years on the Supreme Court, between 1958
and 1962, I attended arguments before the Court with some frequency. One of the
attractions was to observe Justices Frankfurter and Black quarreling fiercely with each
other by putting pointed questions to hapless advocates caught between the two combat-
ting titans.
- 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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standard of knowing must a lawyer meet before acting on the conclu-
sion that the client's testimony will be perjurious; and (2) what should
a lawyer do in a case of actual or anticipated client perjury. Despite the
Justices' obvious interest in these issues, no satisfactory answers were
provided during oral argument or in the Justices' opinions.
In addition, Whiteside is of interest because a third issue that
could have been determinative was not even argued to the Court:
whether the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is im-
plicated when a lawyer divulges or threatens to divulge incriminating
lawyer-client confidences to the court. Accordingly, the following analy-
sis of the argument before the Court will also consider how the fifth
amendment might have been used to advantage by Whiteside's lawyer
and how it still might be used in any subsequent litigation involving the
problem of client perjury.
I. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF KNOWING
Whiteside involved a drug-related killing in Iomia. Defendant
Whiteside claimed self-defense. At trial he testified to his belief that the
victim had been coming at him with a gun, although he did not testify
that he had actually seen a gun.4 After his conviction, Whiteside moved
for a new trial, maintaining that his attorney, Robinson, had improp-
erly coerced him from testifying that he had seen something metallic
(but not specifically a gun) in the victim's hand.5
Whiteside originally told Robinson that he had seen a gun in the
victim's hand.' Subsequently, when pressed by Robinson, Whiteside
said that he had not seen a gun, but that he had been sure that the
victim was holding one.' At that point, Whiteside had not mentioned
seeing something metallic. On a third occasion, Whiteside told Robin-
son that he had in fact seen something metallic in the victim's hand.,
When challenged by his lawyer, Whiteside said, "'[11n Howard Cook's
case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead.' "'
Robinson inferred that any such testimony, whether about a gun
' See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. F at A55-56, Whiteside v. Scurr, 750
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1015) [hereinafter Pet. app. F] (containing portions
of defendant Whiteside's trial testimony).
5 Cf. id. at A70-72 (containing portions of defendant Whiteside's testimony at
hearing on Supplemental Motion for New Trial).
6 See id. at A65-66.
See id. at A78-79 (portion of Attorney Gary L. Robinson's testimony at hearing
on Supplemental Motion for New Trial).
8 See id. at A85.
Sid.
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or about something metallic, would be perjurious."a He therefore
threatened that if Whiteside testified about having seen something me-
tallic, Robinson would "advise the Court of what [Whiteside] was do-
ing" (i.e., committing perjury), and that he "probably would be al-
lowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony."" Robinson
also said that he would "ask the Court for permission to withdraw,"
1 2
which would have left Whiteside with no lawyer.1 3
Had Whiteside testified that he had seen something metallic in the
victim's hand, the jury would not have been able to reject his statement
without finding it false beyond a reasonable doubt. No court found,
however, that Robinson's conclusion that his client was lying met a
reasonable doubt standard. The Iowa Supreme Court found that
Robinson was "convinced with good cause to believe" that Whiteside's
testimony would be false. 4 The Eighth Circuit concluded implicitly
that Robinson had a "firm factual basis for believing" that Whiteside's
testimony would be false.15 Therefore, if the jury had heard White-
side's testimony about having seen something metallic in the victim's
hand, it might have agreed with Robinson. Nevertheless, the jury might
have felt bound to accept Whiteside's testimony if not persuaded be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the testimony was false.'
10 See id. (Robinson stating that he could not allow Whiteside to testify regarding
the presence of a gun "because that would be perjury").
11 Id.
12 Id. at A88.
13 Following a previous change of lawyers at Whiteside's insistence, the trial judge
told Whiteside that his chances of getting another change of attorneys were about zero.
See id. at A53 (hearing on defendant's Request for Appointment of Attorney Thomas
Koehler).
14 State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
15 Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1984). The court entered an
order denying rehearing en banc of the Eighth Circuit's favorable disposition of White-
side's petition for habeas corpus. The court's holding that even a lawyer with a "firm
factual basis for believing that his or her client is about to commit perjury" may not
disclose confidential communications to the trier of fact, combined with the court's or-
der, implies that the court accepted Robinson as having a "firm factual basis" for his
belief. Id.
1I The first analysis of the importance of the "knowing" standard in rules of law-
yers' ethics is in M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-58
(1975). That book states that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility uses a
subjective standard of knowing in half a dozen instances and four different objective
standards with no apparent reason underlying the variations. See M. FREEDMAN,
supra, at 56-57.
Five years later, the 1980 Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct used at least nine different standards of knowing, ranging from when the
lawyer is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" to when the lawyer has "information
indicating" certain facts to be so. In addition, the varying standards in the Model Rules
were demonstrably inconsistent in their applicability. This inconsistency was noted in
The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, which offered appropriate corrections. See
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE RosCOE POUND-AMERICAN
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The standard of knowing was clearly of concern to members of the
Supreme Court. The first questions of the oral argument were ad-
dressed to Brent Appel, then Deputy Attorney General of Iowa, by
Justice O'Connor. She asked: "What standard do you think should be
employed to determine when the facts are sufficient to impose such a
professional obligation on the lawyer? . . .Does the lawyer have to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or just have a mere suspicion, or
what?"' 7 When Mr. Appel waffled in answering her question, Justice
O'Connor pressed by asking what level of "certainty" the lawyer must
have before acting on the conclusion that the client's testimony will be
perjurious."' Mr. Appel then responded:
I think, once again, a lawyer has to know-and under
the Model Penal Code definition, for instance, of what
"know" is, it means a high probability. I would even accept
for argument purposes reasonable-without reasonable
doubt. But let me carry this a step further, because I think I
see where you're heading.
A lawyer before he or she issues anti-perjury admoni-
tions probably should know beyond reasonable doubt that
his client is preparing to commit perjury. I think the facts
clearly bear that out in this case. 9
The same question was raised with Whiteside's lawyer. Counsel
had opened his argument with an effort to narrow the issue before the
Court. The holding of the Eighth Circuit was a limited one, he empha-
sized, in two respects: (1) if the attorney merely "believes" that the
client is going to give false testimony, then (2) the attorney "cannot
disclose or threaten to disclose" the attorney's belief.
20
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 8-9
(Public Discussion Draft 1980).
" Record at 9, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 84-1321) (hereinafter
Record). Although the transcript does not indicate which Justice is asking the question,
I identified each Justice in my notes during the proceedings.
18 See id.
19 Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added). Mr. Appel understood Justice O'Connor, as did
I, to be indicating that she favors a reasonable doubt standard. See Discussion with
Brent Appel, University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium, Limitations on the
Effectiveness of Criminal Defense Counsel (Mar. 1, 1988) (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review). This interpretation would explain why he immediately
abandoned the position taken in his brief that a reasonable doubt standard would be
bad policy and contrary to the "prevailing view" of a "firm factual basis." The brief
also attempted to equate "beyond a reasonable doubt" with a "compelling support"
test, an effort that was also wisely abandoned on oral argument. See Petitioner's Reply
Brief at 3, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 84-1321).
2 Record, supra note 17, at 27. This was not the line of argument suggested to
Whiteside's counsel by three experienced advocates and me in a lengthy preparation
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Justice White immediately interposed a question that challenged
both points. In the view of the Eighth Circuit, Justice White asserted,
it would make no difference how strong the evidence was regarding
whether the client intended to lie on the stand. Even if "no one would
doubt that the client planned to commit perjury," the lawyer "may not
threaten him with anything" to dissuade the perjury.21
Whiteside's counsel made a brief attempt to hold to his position,
but Justice White attacked again.22 Justice White insisted that "no
matter what the degree of certainty" the lawyer has that the client is
going to commit perjury, the holding of the Eighth Circuit would for-
bid the lawyer to inform the court.23 Counsel promptly capitulated.
"That is the holding of the Court of Appeals," he acknowledged, and
Justice White hammered it in with: "Yes. Yes, exactly. . . . [T]hat's
the way it comes to us." '24 Abandoning his opening argument entirely,
counsel meekly responded, "That's correct."
'25
Whiteside's counsel, however, should have held to his original po-
sition. The Eighth Circuit in fact held as counsel had said (or close to
it) on both points:
We hold only that a lawyer who has afirm factual basis for
believing that his or her client is about to commit perjury,
because of confidential communications the client has made
to the lawyer, may not disclose the content of those confiden-
tial communications to the trier of fact . . . .The lawyer
who discloses confidential communications or who threatens
to do so has departed from the role of an advocate and has
become an adversary to the interests of his or her client.
Such a client has lost the effective assistance of counsel, a
right to which even those defendants who may later be ac-
cused of perjury are entitled.28
Thus, the Eighth Circuit referred only to a disclosure of or a
threat to disclose confidential communications. Contrary to Justice
White's assertion, it did not say that the lawyer "may not threaten him
session the day before the argument.
21 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). No emphasis appears in the Official Transcript;
however, my notes of the argument indicate that Justice White stressed the word "any-
thing" with his voice.
22 A former clerk to Justice White once commented to me that the Justice consid-
ers basketball and oral argument to be contact sports.
2 Record, supra note 17, at 28 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 28-29.
25 Id. at 29.
26 Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
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with anything" in an effort to discourage perjury.2" More important,
with regard to the issue of knowing, the Eighth Circuit assumed that
the lawyer had only "a firm factual basis for believing";28 it did not
treat the case as one in which "no one would doubt" that the client was
planning perjury.
2 9
Perhaps if counsel had maintained his initial position that White-
side was entitled to a new trial because his lawyer had applied an inad-
equate standard of knowing, Justice White ultimately would have faced
the issue and agreed. That is strongly suggested by the final exchange
between Justice White and Mr. Appel in the oral argument:
QUESTION: But wouldn't you think this was a rela-
tively rare case, where the defendant just says, I'm going to
commit perjury, and it's so clear? Because you would con-
cede that the lawyer may not-if there's a real doubt about
the truth [of] the thing-
MR. APPEL: Sure.
QUESTION: -you wouldn't be here at all.
MR. APPEL: It's a relatively rare case . . . . But
where it's [mere] conjecture, mere speculation-that is of
course not this case-
QUESTION: Or even if the lawyer is himself com-
pletely convinced that the story his client is telling is false.
MR. APPEL: We don't have a disagreement.30
That exchange followed a statement by Mr. Appel addressed to
Justice O'Connor, the author of Strickland v. Washington.31 The judg-
ment of what the lawyer knows regarding client perjury, Mr. Appel
said, is "for the lawyer to make, much as any other tactical decision an
attorney comes upon in the course of representation."3' 2 That observa-
tion, of course, works both ways. If, as in Whiteside, the trial lawyer
concludes that the client is lying, the lawyer's decision will fall within
2" See supra note 21 and accompanying text. For example, the lawyer might
threaten the client by stating that the judge will increase the sentence if the judge
concludes that the defendant has lied. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53-55
(1978).
21 Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d at 714.
29 Record, supra note 17, at 28.
SO Record, supra note 17, at 58. My notes from the argument interpret this last
question to mean that even if the lawyer is completely convinced of the falseness of the
story, she should still go ahead and present the testimony unless she "knows" that it is
false. Mr. Appel told me during the Symposium that his understanding of Justice
White's comment is the same as mine.
Si 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22 Record, supra note 17, at 57.
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"the wide range of professionally competent assistance" allowed by
Strickland.3 3 If, on the other hand, the trial lawyer makes the judg-
ment that the client's story is not false beyond a reasonable doubt, that
decision, too, will receive the deference accorded by Strickland to the
trial lawyer's decisions.
Neither Justice O'Connor nor any other Justice questioned Mr.
Appel's interpretation of Strickland as applied to a lawyer's discretion-
ary judgment when faced with a possible perjury. Instead, Justice
White emphasized that Whiteside presented "a relatively rare case,"
and that even a lawyer "completely convinced that the story his client is
telling is false" could nevertheless choose to go forward."'
Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion for himself and
four members of the Court, including Justices O'Connor and White.
Interestingly, that opinion does not address the question that concerned
both those Justices so much during oral argument. Rather, the Chief
Justice refers glancingly to "an intent to commit perjury, communi-
cated to counsel . . . .- Although that may overstate what Whiteside
actually said to Robinson, it provides the factual basis upon which the
majority opinion is premised. 6 It also may indicate the standard that a
majority of the Court might require if the issue should return to the
Court in a different factual context.
Justice Blackmun, writing for himself and three colleagues, also
does not directly address the knowing issue. The attorney's certainty
that the proposed testimony is false is part of the "complex interaction
of factors, which is likely to var from case to case, [and which] makes
inappropriate a blanket rule that defense attorneys must reveal, or
threaten to reveal, a client's anticipated perjury to the court."' 7 How-
ever, "[e]xcept in the rarest of cases, attorneys who adopt 'the role of
the judge or jury to determine the facts' . . . pose a danger of depriving
3 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also Record, supra note 17, at 57 (Justice
O'Connor stating that a reviewing court's assessment of a "lawyer's conduct should use
the deferential standards that are in Washington v. Strickland").
3, Record, supra note 17, at 57.
'5 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 163.
"n "As we view this case, it appears perfectly clear that respondent intended to
commit perjury, [and] that his lawyer knew it . . . ." Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens added:
Nevertheless, beneath the surface of this case there are areas of un-
certainty that cannot be resolved today. A lawyer's certainty that a change
in his client's recollection is a harbinger of intended perjury-as well as
judicial review of such apparent certainty-should be tempered by the re-
alization that, after reflection, the most honest witness may recall (or sin-
cerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked.
Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth
Amendment.""8 Thus, the key question remains unanswered: what
standard of knowing is required before a lawyer may threaten to reveal
a client confidence to prevent the client from committing perjury?
II. THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO CLIENT PERJURY AND THE
IMPACT OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Another unanswered question, both at oral argument and in the
opinion of the Court, is whether Whiteside was prejudiced by the viola-
tion of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
his lawyer threatened to volunteer the defendant's confidential commu-
nications to the court. Again, it was Justice White, a potential swing
vote, who put the question most pointedly:
QUESTION: One of the elements of an inadequate as-
sistance of counsel is there's got to be some prejudice.
Now, the argument for the defendant has to be that his
being deprived of perjured testimony is prejudice.
I'd say all you [Mr. Appel] have to do is convince us
that that isn't so and you win your case, don't you?39
An appropriate response on Whiteside's behalf would have been:
Justice White, the answer to your question about
prejudice is given in your own opinion for the Court in
Fisher v. United States.40 In that case, you held that when
documents could not be obtained from a defendant by sub-
poena because of the fifth amendment privilege, those same
documents could not be obtained from the defendant's law-
yer, because of the lawyer-client privilege.
Your reasoning was that "if the client knows that dam-
aging information could more readily be obtained from the
attorney following disclosure than from himself in the ab-
sence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed
38 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122
(3d Cir. 1977)).
"I Record, supra note 17, at 12.
40 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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legal advice. "41
In this case, Whiteside was prejudiced because, as this
Court unanimously held in Upjohn v. United States,4 it was
"essential to proper representation" that Whiteside be able
to confide in his lawyer.4' Having done so in order to protect
his sixth amendment right to proper representation, he then
found himself threatened by his own lawyer with violation of
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
That is not only prejudicial to Whiteside, but adoption
of such a rule would be prejudicial to the proper administra-
tion of justice, for the reasons you explained in Fisher.
Unfortunately, that argument was never made in Nix v. Whiteside
because Whiteside's counsel chose not to raise the fifth amendment or
even to cite Fisher in the brief. Had he done so, Justice White, at least,
might have seen the case differently. Thus, the fifth amendment is still
a possible basis for overturning a conviction in a future variation on
Whiteside.
Another relevant fifth amendment case omitted from Whiteside's
brief is Estelle v. Smith,"" which involved a psychiatrist's examination
of a defendant's competency to stand trial. The defendant was not ad-
vised of his privilege against self-incrimination, nor was his lawyer in-
formed of the examination. Although the psychiatrist did not testify at
trial, at the post-trial sentencing hearing he did give his opinion that
the defendant was dangerous. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger noted that, during the psychiatric evaluation, the defendant "as-
suredly . . was 'not in the presence of [a person] acting solely in his
interest.' ,,4 Rather, the psychiatrist's apparent neutrality changed, and
he became at the sentencing trial essentially "an agent of the State re-
counting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting." '46
Accordingly, the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights had been
violated, and the sentence was vacated.
The parallel to Whiteside is plain. Robinson threatened to do ex-
actly what the psychiatrist in Estelle had done: become an "agent of the
state" and testify against the defendant using unwarned statements
47
41 Id. at 403.
42 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
43 Id. at 389-91 (1981) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry EC 4-1 (1980)).
44 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
41 Id. at 467 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
46 Id.
47 Robinson did not forewarn Whiteside that he would reveal confidences to the
judge and jury if Whiteside were to commit perjury. According to Robinson's testimony
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that the defendant had reason to believe were being made to a person
who was, at least, neutral.
Another uncited case is United States v. Henry."8 In that case, a
government informer who had been placed in the same cell with Henry
established a relationship of trust and confidence with him. As a result,
Henry revealed incriminating information to the informer. Again,
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the Court, holding that be-
cause Henry's conviction was based in part on the admissions elicited
through a false relationship of trust and confidence, Henry's sixth
amendment right to counsel had been violated.49
It is difficult to understand how Whiteside's lawyer can properly
do, or threaten to do, what the cellmate may not: establish a relation-
ship of trust and confidence, then disclose to the court the incriminating
communications that result. In fact, the situation involving the lawyer
appears more egregious than that involving the cellmate. The Supreme
Court has never described trust and confidence between cellmates as
"imperative," but it has used that word in describing the relationship of
trust and confidence between lawyer and client.5"
How might the Court have harmonized such cases had they been
argued? Chief Justice Burger, of course, has a well-earned reputation
for utter fearlessness when confronted with the hobgoblin of intellectual
honesty."' However, might not Justice White, Justice Powell, or Jus-
tice O'Connor have been given pause by such prior authorities?
To argue the fifth amendment in conjunction with the lawyer-cli-
ent privilege, pursuant to Fisher, would inevitably raise the question of
at the hearing on the new trial motion, "the only time it came up" was after Whiteside
had already made the statements that Robinson found to be incriminating. Pet. app. F,
supra note 4, at A88 (containing a portion of Attorney Gary L. Robinson's testimony
at hearing on Supplemental Motion for New Trial).
48 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
49 See id. at 274.
" See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (stating that the attor-
ney-client privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust").
" See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations
on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198-
1201 (1971) (analyzing Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971)). Harris, in turn, was an important precedent in Nix v. Whiteside. See
Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 173 (stating that "Harris and other cases make it crystal clear
that there is no right whatever-constitutional or otherwise-for a defendant to use
false evidence").
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Whiteside has already come under such criti-
cism. See, e.g., Lefstein, Reflections on the Client Perjury Dilemma and Nix v. White-
side, CRIM. JUST., Summer, 1986, at 27, 28 (accusing the majority opinion in White-
side of "a shocking misstatement of the law pertaining to client perjury"). Other errors
in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Whiteside are discussed in Freedman, The After-
math of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora's Box, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
25, 26-27 (1987).
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whether perjury should be treated, like other "future crimes," as a per-
mitted exception to confidentiality.52 The communication is not pro-
tected, for example, if the client tells the lawyer that the client is going
to shoot a government witness.
Relinquishing the fifth amendment, however, did not avoid ques-
tions about whether perjury is "[f]undamentally any different" from
shooting a witness.53 Predictably, such questions came up repeatedly
during oral argument, usually in the context of the false issue of
whether there is a constitutional "right" to commit perjury. Chief Jus-
tice Burger was the first to make the point that the facts of Whiteside
are indistinguishable from a case in which a client expresses an inten-
tion to kill a witness and the lawyer "talks him out of [it]. ' ' 4 Mr.
Appel readily agreed.
55
Justice Stevens was troubled by this issue. He asked Whiteside's
lawyer, not rhetorically, but in the obvious hope of obtaining an an-
swer, for a satisfactory distinction between the two situations. Would it
be unethical, Justice Stevens asked, if the lawyer threatened both to
inform the judge and to withdraw from the case if the client followed
through with an expressed intention to kill a witness?56 After a non-
responsive answer, Justice Stevens restated the question and, gently,
asked again, "[W]hy is it different?" 57 The advocate's colloquy with the
Court went downhill precipitously:
[COUNSEL FOR WHITESIDE]: Well, okay. It's still
different from the situation with the witness because having
the client-having the attorney-client privilege remain invio-
late and having the attorney still give his guiding hand to the
client is part of the traditional adversarial system. Nothing
in terms of bribing jurors or threatening witnesses has ever
been recognized as part of the adversarial system in this
country or in any other country that I know of, and that is
an important-
QUESTION [BY JUSTICE REHNQUIST]: Well,
has perjury ever been recognized as part of the adversary
system?
[COUNSEL]: No, it hasn't . . . . [T]here is certainly
52 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1987).
53 Chief Justice Burger asked this question during oral argument. See Record,
supra note 17, at 18.
54 Id.
5 See id.
- See id. at 29.
57 Id. at 30.
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not a constitutional right to perjure oneself . . .
On another occasion, when similarly superficial or self-defeating
answers were given, Justice Rehnquist took the opportunity to express
the exasperation of the Court:
You're simply-that may satisfy you as an answer. It's
just utterly unconvincing to me as why the three [murder of
a witness, bribery of a juror, and perjury by the defendant]
shouldn't be treated the same way for conflict of interest
purposes. 59
Ultimately, the equation of perjury and other crimes became part
of the majority opinion:
The crime of perjury in this setting is indistinguishable in
substance from the crime of threatening or tampering with a
witness or a juror. A defendant who informed his counsel
that he was arranging to bribe or threaten witnesses or
members of the jury would have no "right" to insist on
counsel's assistance or silence . . . . [T]he responsibility of
an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court and a key com-
ponent of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth,
is essentially the same whether the client announces an in-
tention to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit
or procure perjury. 60
However, perjury is significantly different from killing a witness
or bribing a juror. This is illustrated by the comment of a United States
Attorney speaking on a panel on lawyers' ethics. What should the de-
fense lawyer do, a member of the audience asked, when a client pro-
poses to commit perjury? "Do me a favor," the United States Attorney
responded. "Let him try it." 1
That response is not surprising. Dean Wigmore has called cross-
examination "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth."62 That is, the adversary system assumes perjury and is
designed, in part, to deal with it. By contrast, bribing a juror corrupts
the adversary system at its core, and prevents the system from function-
58 Id. at 30-31.
8 Id. at 44.
60 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 174.
81 Remarks by S. Martoche at the Seminar on "Ethics in an Adversary System"
(Feb. 11, 1984) (The Seminar was presented in Buffalo, New York by the Erie County
Bar Association and chaired by M. Mahoney.).
62 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974).
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ing. If the question put to the ethics panel had been, "What should the
defense lawyer do when a client proposes to kill a witness or bribe a
juror?," the United States Attorney would not have replied, "Do me a
favor. Let him try it."
Moreover, bribery is clandestine, usually not suspected when com-
mitted, and difficult to detect. Perjury, by contrast, takes place in the
goldfish bowl of the courtroom, before a skeptical judge and jury, and is
subject to immediate impeachment. Also, when perjury is detected by
the court, the defendant faces the likelihood of an increased sentence.63
Nevertheless, there may be a reason to require a lawyer to divulge
a client's intent to commit perjury; however, that reason cannot be
Chief Justice Burger's rationale that perjury and bribing a juror are
"essentially the same." Echoing Justice Rehnquist's words: "[Tihat
may satisfy you as an answer. It's just utterly unconvincing to
me ... ""
I mentioned earlier the false issue of whether there is a "right" to
testify perjuriously. Clearly there is not. A defendant must testify truth-
fully or suffer the consequences.6 5 The consequences, however, are not
forfeiture of the right to counsel or of confidentiality of communications
with counsel. Rather, the defendant faces "the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances," which is the "traditional truth-test-
ing device[] of the adversary system." 6 Also, the defendant's sentence
can be increased, 7 and the defendant can be prosecuted for perjury.
The real issue is whether the search for truth sometimes must be
subordinated to other values, such as the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. In New Jersey v. Portash,8 for example, Portash had been
granted use immunity 9 for grand jury testimony. When he was subse-
63 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (holding that a judge may
consider the falsity of defendant's testimony in sentencing).
Further, as Whiteside illustrates, the lawyer ordinarily learns about the defend-
ant's intended perjury as a result of a series of interviews with the client about the very
offense that has been charged. That is, the lawyer's knowledge of the client's perjury is
usually the direct outcome of lawyer-client communications about the crime that has
been charged. Thus, knowledge of the "future crime" of perjury is inextricably inter-
woven with the crime that is the subject of the representation. A client's announcement
of an intent to kill a witness, on the other hand, is a fact that stands separate and apart
from communications about the crime that is the subject of the representation, such as
what Whiteside did or did not see in the victim's hand just before he stabbed him.
' Record, supra note 17, at 44.
65 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
66 Id.
87 See Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
68 440 U.S. 450 (1979). Portash was cited in Whiteside's brief, but was not used
in oral argument until it was too late and out of context. See Record, supra note 17, at
46.
69 Use immunity is immunity from the use of compelled testimony against an un-
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quently prosecuted he presented an alibi that was inconsistent with his
grand jury testimony, and the prosecution therefore sought to impeach
him.70 The Supreme Court held that Portash had a constitutional right
to present his alibi without being impeached with his inconsistent
grand jury testimony.71
In Portash, the Court's decision was not intended to give the de-
fendant a right or license to commit perjury. The Court did hold, how-
ever, that forfeiture of Portash's fifth amendment privilege was not one
of the consequences of his perjury.72 Moreover, there was no suggestion
that Portash's lawyer had acted improperly in presenting what the
Court assumed to have been a perjurious alibi. 3 Although "arriving at
the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system,"74 it must some-
times be subordinate to constitutional rights.7 5 Thus, the prejudice to
Whiteside-a prejudice of constitutional status-was in the threat to
deprive him of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Another observer at the oral argument, Lyle Denniston, correctly
identified "It]he most damaging exchanges. ' 7' Near the end of the oral
argument, Justice Powell spoke for the first time. " '[I]t would help
me,' he said in a quiet voice, 'if you would summarize exactly what you
think the lawyer should have done in this case.' 77 What comes
through in the transcript, as well as in Denniston's recounting of the
exchange, is that Whiteside's counsel tried to avoid giving the necessary
answer until he was "[b]acked into a corner" by Justice Powell's gentle
but persistent inquiries. 78 " 'The answer to my question,' " the Justice
finally said dryly, "'is the lawyer should have permitted the defendant
to testify and kept his mouth shut.' ,,71
One lesson of that "most damaging" colloquy is that an advocate
cannot maintain a position that the advocate is reluctant to present to
the court in a forthright manner. Rather than deal with the issue belat-
edly and in an evasive manner, Whiteside's advocate should have set
forth a coherent answer to Justice Powell's question long before it was
willing witness. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972).
70 See Portash, 440 U.S. at 453-54.
7' See id. at 459.
72 See id.
'3 See id. at 452-53.
74 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).
71 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (recog-
nizing that the fifth amendment rests on values of respect for the individual and his
privacy that may conflict with the pursuit of truth in the trial setting).
" Denniston, Tackling the Attorney-Client Conundrum, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb.
1986, at 131, 131.
17 Id. (quoting Record, supra note 17, at 51).
78 Id.
79 Id. (quoting Record, supra note 17, at 53).
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asked. As Whiteside's advocate ultimately presented it, however, his
own argument appeared to be an embarrassment to him. Further, he
never set forth a full and coherent answer to the fundamental question
of the case: what should a defense lawyer do regarding possible client
perjury?
Whiteside's lawyer should have answered: At the outset of the
lawyer-client relationship, pursuant to the ABA Standards, the lawyer
should establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the client.
To do so, the lawyer should emphasize two points: first, it is essential
that the lawyer know everything about the charges against the client,
and second, the lawyer will hold that information in strict confidence.80
If the client accepts the lawyer's pledge of confidentiality and the
lawyer thereby learns that the client is going to commit perjury, the
lawyer should take advantage of the knowledge-knowledge that the
lawyer rarely would have without the pledge of confidentiality-to dis-
suade the client from testifying falsely. Dissuasion might well include
threats of adverse tactical and legal consequences, including a longer
sentence, but it should not include threats to betray the lawyer's pledge
of confidentiality.
If the client nevertheless insists upon going forward with the false
testimony, the lawyer should withdraw from the case if that can be
done without significant harm to the client. If the lawyer finds it neces-
sary to remain in the case, the lawyer should continue efforts to dis-
suade the client. Such ongoing efforts have often proved successful.
In the rare case in which the client persists, the lawyer must pre-
sent the client's testimony in the ordinary way and remain true to the
lawyer's pledge of confidentiality. If lawyers were to follow any other
course, it would soon become common knowledge that clients cannot
trust their lawyers with confidential information. The result would not
be less perjury, but more, because lawyers would cease to have either
the knowledge or the trust that enables them to dissuade clients from
wrongful conduct in general and from perjury in particular.
After Nix v. Whiteside was decided by the Court, the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility attempted to
apply Whiteside in a Formal Opinion." According to the Committee, a
lawyer should take the following steps when a client states an intention
80 See 1 PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR AS-
SOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
4-3.1(a) (1974).
81 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353
(1987).
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to testify falsely, but has not yet done so:
[T]he Committee does not believe that the mandatory disclo-
sure requirement of this Model Rule provision [3.3(a)(2)] is
necessarily triggered when a client states an intention to tes-
tify falsely, but has not yet done so. Ordinarily, after warn-
ing the client of the consequences of the client's perjury, in-
cluding the lawyer's duty to disclose it to the court, the
lawyer can reasonably believe that the client will be per-
suaded not to testify falsely at trial. That is exactly what
happened in Nix v. Whiteside. Under these circumstances,
the lawyer may permit the client to testify and may examine
the client in the normal manner. If the client does in fact
testify falsely, the lawyer's obligation to make disclosure to
the court is covered by Rule 3.3(a)(2) and (4).82
That is, the lawyer can assume that the client will be dissuaded by the
threat of disclosure and will forego the perjury. If, however, the client
should then surprise the lawyer with false testimony, the lawyer would
be obligated to carry out the threat and inform the court.
Interestingly, that was precisely the hypothetical case that Justice
White posed to Mr. Appel during the argument. This was the
exchange:
QUESTION [JUSTICE WHITE]: [A]fter the lawyer
said he would withdraw and so on, did the client then say, I
won't do that?
MR. APPEL: No, he said-well, the lawyer left it:
Think about that, think about the admonitions.
QUESTION: All right. Well, but then he, without any
further communication, he put him on the stand?
MR. APPEL: No. He came back and they went
through questions and answers again. The record is not clear
as to what occurred on those subsequent meetings.
QUESTION: But suppose this. Suppose the client then
had gotten on the stand and in the course of his examination
he said he saw something in his hand. Well, the lawyer
could have cured it all, if he thought he was going to commit
perjury, by getting out of the case or at least trying to get
out.
82 Id. at 21, 23-24. Opinion 87-353 is intended to apply only in jurisdictions that
have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. at 21. With respect to
the question of client perjury under the Model Code of Professional Conduct, the opin-
ion adopts the position that I have taken. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 16, at 27-41.
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But if he gets surprised, may he then say, may I ap-
proach the bench, and say to the judge that this fellow's
lying?
MR. APPEL: Yes.
QUESTION: You think he could do that?[!]
83
The incredulity in Justice White's voice is not conveyed ade-
quately by the transcript.84 After a similar exchange, however, Mr.
Appel caught it, and avoided pursuing the issue by observing that "that
is not the situation that we're facing.""5 To which Justice White re-
plied, "No, no."88
Others may draw different inferences from what Justice White
said and how he said it. My own inference is that there are not likely
to be five members of the Supreme Court who would permit the lawyer
to disclose the client's perjury after the fact. Thus, if a lawyer assumes
that the client will heed the lawyer's admonitions, but then is surprised
at trial, the lawyer will not be permitted, as proposed in Formal Opin-
ion 87-353, to disclose the client's perjury at that point.8 7 In any event,
Justice Brennan's observation already has proved prophetic: "Lawyers,
judges, bar associations, students, and others should understand that the
problem [of the lawyer's response to client perjury] has not now been
'decided.' "88
8 Record, supra note 17, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
84 Justice White's incredulity may have arisen from his view of the role of defense
counsel in our adversary system. According to Justice White, while law enforcement
officers
must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the ascer-
tainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime[,]...
defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the
truth. . . .Defense counsel need present nothing even if he knows what
the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the
prosecution's case.
United State v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citing, among other sources, Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966)).
85 Record, supra note 17, at 21.
86 Id.
87 Justice Stevens observed in his opinion that the Court has not yet "confront[ed]
the much more difficult questions of what a lawyer must, should, or may do after his
client has given testimony that the lawyer does not believe." Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 191
(Stevens, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (distinguishing the issue in the case, whether the defendant was deprived of his
sixth amendment right to counsel, from any issue concerning the ethical propriety of
counsel's actions).
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CONCLUSION
Nix v. Whiteside"9 presented extremely difficult facts to argue -for
Whiteside. As Brent Appel repeatedly hammered home in his brief and
oral argument, Whiteside took the stand and testified to self-defense,
telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Moreover,
Whiteside's lawyer never disclosed Whiteside's confidential communi-
cations to anyone. Whiteside's only complaint was that he was not per-
mitted to embellish his story with what was assumed to be a lie, and
what was also understood to be tactically unsound. o Under Strickland
v. Washington,91 Whiteside had to show prejudice, and prejudice is not
self-evident on the face of the Whiteside case.
Nevertheless, Whiteside's advocate wrongly conceded at the outset
of his argument that the standard of knowing was not an issue. He also
wrongly conceded that the circuit court would not permit a lawyer to
threaten the client with "anything," when in fact the circuit court ex-
pressly limited its holding to a disclosure of or a threat to disclose law-
yer-client confidences.
In addition, Whiteside's lawyer did not argue the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and omitted citation of highly ma-
terial cases like Fisher v. United States,92 Estelle v. Smith, 3 and
United States v. Henry.94 One of the most important questions that
remains unanswered by Whiteside, therefore, is whether Whiteside's
conviction could have survived attack under the fifth amendment.
Whiteside's lawyer also failed to offer any rational distinction be-
tween perjury and crimes like murder of a witness and bribery of a
juror. Further, he conceded that there is "no right to commit perjury"
in a context in which he appeared to be acknowledging that there had
therefore been no prejudice.
Finally, Whiteside's lawyer never presented a coherent answer to
Justice Powell's question, which was the underlying question of Nix v.
Whiteside: What should the defense lawyer do about client perjury?
Ironically, as the concurring opinions make clear, that, too, remains one
of the unanswered questions in Nix v. Whiteside.
89 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
90 See id. at 184-85 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
93 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
447 U.S. 264 (1980).
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